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ABSTRACT	  	  
Militaries have played significant roles in the transition from authoritarian regimes to more 
democratic political systems. Most of these transitions took place during the seventies and 
eighties in South Europe and Latin America. They often started with cracks within the ruling 
party, which ultimately led to a gradual transition towards the installation of another regime 
and in most cases to some form of democratization. Based on those empirical examples a few 
key indicators predicting the behaviour of a military in transitions can be distinguished. An 
institutionalised military, which is not directly involved in the administration apparatus and 
which position has been backed by a legal framework have been found willing to shape the 
transition period to a more democratic system. During the transition the civilian authorities 
should guarantee the military certain prerogatives in order to keep it satisfied. An end of the 
transition period is reached when an effective and strong civilian government is installed 
which is able to execute civilian oversight over the military.  
 The recent popular uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East were not gradual and 
caused an abrupt regime change in several Arab countries. Only in Egypt the military took a 
leading role in the transition. This thesis shows that also in the case of Egypt the nature of the 
military as an institutionalized military, not directly involved in the day to day governing, 
made it very resistant to any form of democratization. In the three proposed constitutions it 
has demanded and granted itself extensive prerogatives and annulled any form of civilian 
oversight. This will make it very difficult for any future civilian leader to execute civilian 
oversight over the military. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION  
 “A revolution that removed a regime, before the people destroyed it.  
We did not protect the revolution, we made it happen”  
– Egyptian Major Haytham in the documentary film ‘The Square’ 
 
“We left the square before the power was in our hands”  
– Protestor at Tahrir square in the documentary film ‘The Square’  
 
At the end of 2010 and beginning of 2011 mass demonstrations erupted throughout the Arab 
world. People called for freedom, social justice and human dignity and the downfall of the 
regime. The first country where mass demonstrations broke out was Tunisia. On January 14, 
2011 President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, who ruled Tunisia for 23 years, was ousted. Inspired 
by the Tunisian ‘revolution’, mass popular mobilizations took place in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, 
Bahrain and Syria. Major protests broke out as well in Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco 
and Sudan and minor protests in Mauritania, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Djibouti, Western Sahara 
and the Palestinian Territories (Blight, Pulham & Torpe, 2012)  
 The mass demonstration across the Arab world late 2010 and at the beginning of 2011 
caught many Middle East scholars by surprise. Scholars have been focusing on explaining the 
robustness of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), as authoritarianism has dominated 
the region for over forty years (see for example Diamond, 2010; Kedourie, 1992). The 
toppling of the authoritarian leaders in Tunisia and Egypt took place in a respectively short 
period of time. Hosni Mubarak, who had been Egypt’s president for 30 years, stepped down 
on February 11, 2011, eighteen days after protests against his regime had started. In Tunisia, 
Ben Ali stepped down after one month of protests against his regime. This left the opposition 
with very little time to organize itself and to fill in the power vacuum (Bayat, 2013; Miller et 
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al., 2012). The opposition groups in Tunisia were contrary to the revolutionaries in Egypt able 
to organize themselves, to form a transitional government and to organize elections. In Egypt 
the opposition was less well organized and exhausted by the Mubarak regime. It was not able 
to fill in the power vacuum and instead expected the institutions of the old regime, as the 
military, to carry out reforms for them: to modify the constitution, hold elections, guarantee 
freedom of political parties and institutionalize a democratic government (Bayat, 2013).   
 In Egypt the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) took the leading role in the 
transition. Egypt’s military has played a significant role in Egypt’s politics since 1952, when 
the military under the leadership of General Gamal Abdel Nasser came to power by a coup 
d’etat. Under Mubarak the military was not directly involved in day-to-day politics, but 
played an influential role behind the scenes (Cook, 2007). The guidance of the transition by 
the military makes it questionable to what extent the military, as a remnant of the old regime, 
will be willing to give up power and will be willing to allow for democratization.  
 The role of militaries in transitional phases – the interval between one political regime 
and another – in relation to democratization is the subject of this thesis. The central research 
question of the thesis is to what extent and under what conditions political militaries are 
willing to allow for democratization during a political transition. The main argument 
presented is that militaries in a political transition will look out for their own institutional 
interests. Political militaries will be only willing to allow for democratization once they 
believe their institutional interests are protected. Therefore the civilian authorities should 
guarantee the military certain prerogatives in order to keep it satisfied. Disengagement of a 
political military will most likely be negotiated, incremental and pacific.  
 The research question will be answered theoretically by exploring theories on civil-
military relations, the role of military institutions in politics and their relation with 
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democratization. The research question will be answered empirically by a single-case study 
on the role of the Egyptian military after the ousting of former president Mubarak. 
 Exploring the Egyptian case is as well scientifically as social relevant, as it will add 
new insights to the already existing literature on the role of militaries in political transitions in 
relation to democratization. Most of the discussed literature has been written more than 
twenty years ago and bases its conclusions on countries that had prior experience with 
democracy. Exploring the case of Egypt enables to test existing expectations on the role of the 
military in a transition and to add relevant and new insights to the existing literature.  
 The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter two, the theoretical framework, will 
introduce and discuss the main theoretical concepts central in the research question. Chapter 
three will discuss the research design, methodology and operationalization of key indicators. 
Chapter four provides the context for the case study and explores the values of the 
independent variables. Chapter five presents the main results of the case study and chapter 
seven gives answer to the research question in a conclusion.  
CHAPTER II: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
	  
A great deal of ink has been spent on describing the role of the military before, during, and 
after political transitions have taken place. Many of those descriptions are case studies 
describing how militaries have behaved in certain countries or certain regions. A general 
framework or school of thought predicting how a military would behave during a political 
transition or when it will return to its barracks is lacking. To a great extent this is 
understandable as the context of a political system and culture will for a great deal determine 
the political manoeuvrability of the military and its willingness to disengage from politics. 
Some scholars have tried to develop some classifications and have produced tentative 
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conclusions. In this theoretical framework the most influential works on the role of militaries 
during political transitions will be discussed, building on examples from primarily Latin 
America and Southern Europe (including Turkey).  
In order to be able to answer the research question, to what extent and under what 
conditions a political military is willing to allow for democratization during a political 
transition, a few concepts need to be explained and defined at first. Those concepts are 
political transition and political militaries. Democratization will be defined and 
operationalized in the methodology section. Secondly literature on the political role of 
militaries will be discussed, touching upon civil-military relations theories and the different 
forms of militarized authoritarian regimes. Thirdly the behaviour and willingness to disengage 
from politics of political militaries and to allow for democratization during a political 
transition will be explored. Fourthly and lastly some examples from the literature on how the 
political role of militaries has been diminished over time and some recommendations on how 
civilian authorities can install civilian oversight over the military will be discussed.  
 
2.1 Political Transitions 
 
In four of the six Arab countries where uprisings occurred, a political transition took or is 
taking place, meaning: a transition from an authoritarian regime into ‘something else’. An 
authoritarian regime refers to the capacity of a regime to wield together relevant elites that are 
connected to each other through a network of trust, interests, favours and friendships and the 
capacity to exhaust any alternative to their regime. Cross cutting loyalties exist between high 
political elites and high security officers. Military and/or security institutions often act as the 
guardians of the authoritarian regime and form the key variable in explaining their stability 
(Droz-Vincent, 2011: 6-7; Cook, 2007: 2).  
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 The transition into ‘something else’ can be the instalment of a political democracy, the 
restoration of a new form of authoritarian rule, ‘simply confusion’, by which is meant that 
successive governments fail to institutionalize political power, or widespread violence, which 
gives way to a revolutionary regime (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986: 6). The transition 
paradigm was introduced in the eighties by O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (1986) 
based on the political transitions most South European and Latin American countries were 
experiencing in the seventies and eighties from authoritarian rule towards a political 
democracy. These transitions were often characterized by remnants of the authoritarian 
regime which provided more rights to individuals and groups by modifying their own rules 
(O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986: 65).  
The transition period ends according to O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) when politics 
is back to ‘normality’, meaning that there is a clear set of rules which are obeyed about ways 
to access government positions and procedures on decision-making. In short, political 
transition refers to the interval between the dissolution of the authoritarian regime and the 
installation of the other regime, being it a democratic, authoritarian, revolutionary or a hybrid 
one (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986: 6; Stepan & Linz, 2013).  
 
Figure 1: Schematic view of transition period  
 
 
 
 
 
     
Authoritarian regime	   Political transition	   a) Democratic regime 
b) Authoritarian regime 
c) Revolutionary regime 
d) Hybrid regime  
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Contrary to most political transformations in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe, 
the political transformations in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) did not start with 
cracks in the government and were not elite and top down driven, but where caused by 
popular uprisings. These uprisings were marked by the eruption of nonviolent mass protests 
over multiple days across multiple geographical locations and the control of protestors over 
public spaces, such as Tahrir square in Cairo, Egypt and the Pearl Roundabout in Manama, 
Bahrain (Brownlee, Masoud & Reynolds, 2013: 35). Furthermore most of the Arab countries 
do not have prior experience with democracy as most Latin American, Southern and Eastern 
European countries had. Mass-based political parties, labour unions and independent press are 
almost non-existent and moreover democracy in the MENA is often linked with colonial 
supremacy, rather than with self-determination (Bellin, 2004: 152; Cook, 2007: 3-7).   
 The political transitions towards democracy in Romania in 2005 and in Kyrgyzstan in 
2010 show however that even without democratic experience and a strong civil society 
democratization is possible. As well the case of Portugal, where levels of political 
participation were low before the transition, proves this (Miller et al., 2012: 305). If 
democratization will succeed in the Arab world depends according to Fukuyama (2014) on 
the ability of the underlying social groups to mobilize. According to him democratization 
goes in three stages: (1) initial mobilization to get rid of the old regime, (2) holding free 
elections, and (3) being able to deliver public services and public goods. The main problem is 
that the first stage often succeeds, but that the second and third stage are very hard to realize 
because of lack of experience with the organisation of political parties. Furthermore the 
Middle East has long been dominated by militarized authoritarian regimes, and “political 
armies have been and still are one of the key variables shaping the origins and the course of 
democratic transitions” (Koonings & Kruijt, 2002: 2). According to Eva Bellin (2004: 152-
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153) the removal of the coercive apparatus from politics is a prerequisite for the consolidation 
of democracy.  
2.2 Military Involvement in Authoritarian Regimes  
 
The extent to which the military is involved in governance and politics and the extent to 
which it holds directly power will for a great part determine the behaviour of the military 
when a political transition occurs. As mentioned before military institutions often act as 
guardians of an authoritarian regime. In such regimes, no civilian control over the military 
exists and the military fulfils many functions which go beyond its standard mandate of 
defending the country (Huntington, 1995: 10). In this section the main characteristics of the 
military profession, a military organisation and the different roles it can play in politics will 
be discussed.   
 
2.2.1 The Military as Institution  
 
In political democracies militaries are professionalized, political neutral and controlled by 
civilian authorities. Huntington (1957), still among the most cited in civil-military relations 
literature, makes a distinction between subjective and objective civilian control over the 
military. Subjective control means that the power of some civilian groups is maximized vis-a-
vis the military. Objective civilian control aims to minimize the power of the military by 
professionalizing it and making it political neutral (Huntington, 1995: 9-10). According to 
Huntington (1957) military professionalism consists of: expertise, responsibility and 
corporatism. Expertise refers to the education and experience of military personnel. 
Responsibility refers to the role of the military; as defender of a state it can be essential for the 
existence of a state. Corporatism refers to the shared sense of unity among military personnel 
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(Huntington, 1957: 8-10). Finer (1962: 7) adds to this a centralized command, hierarchy, 
discipline, intercommunication, esprit de corps and self-sufficiency and Janowitz (1960: 36) a 
monopoly on legitimate means of violence.  
The standard mandate of a military is to defend its country against external security 
threats. Next to defending its country, its mandate is to maintain internal security and order 
and to look out for its own institutional interest. These institutional interests are to maintain 
internal cohesion, to protect its image and national legitimacy, and to secure its economic 
interests. The military has both institutional as individual economic interests, think of access 
to first-rate military equipment and of salaries, benefits or professional promotion 
opportunities (Bellin, 2012: 131; Cook, 2007: 18). In militarized authoritarian regimes the 
mandate of the military is extended into extra-military areas, such as governing and running 
enterprises.  
 
2.2.2. Political militaries  
 
The extent to which and the way militaries are involved in authoritarian regimes differs. In 
general can be said that the less a political system is developed and the lower the legitimacy 
of civilian rule, the more likely the military will engage in politics (Finer, 1962: 164-204; 
Koonings & Kruijt, 2002: 17). Overt military rule is however rare and short-lived. Militaries 
often act as a political force from behind the scenes or some form of a quasi-civilian façade 
(Finer, 1962: 3-4). Political militaries are characterized by the fact that they hold certain 
prerogatives, meaning: “the military’s acquired right or privilege, formal or informal, to 
exercise effective control over its internal governance, to play a role within extramilitary areas 
within the state apparatus, or even to structure relationships between the state and political 
and civil society” (Stepan, 1988: 9). In militarized authoritarian regimes the military often 
16 The Role of the Military in Political Transitions   	  
	  
decides on legislation, the constitution and on the post of chief executive (Aguero, 1998: 
385).  
 During the years there have been different forms of militarized authoritarian regimes. 
Finer (1962: 164-204; 1974: 5-27) categorises those regimes on basis of their political 
structures and their constitutional role. He distinguishes five political structures on the basis 
of the extent to which the military controls major policies and the degree of overtness. These 
are (1) direct open military rule, (2) direct quasi-civilianized rule, (3) indirect continuous rule, 
(4) indirect intermittent rule and, (5) dual rule. The military dictatorship in Argentina from 
1966 to 1973 is an example of open direct military rule, while the political interventions of 
the Turkish military to “set things right” is an example of direct rule, followed by indirect 
intermittent rule (Finer, 1974: 11-13).    
 Secondly a distinction can be made between militaries intending to stay in power or 
remain in control over those in power and those intending to exert temporary control over the 
state to “set things right” (Finer, 1974: 6-8). The level of institutionalization of those 
militaries intending to stay in power into the regime has taken different forms. 
Institutionalization of the military into the regime involves formal rules, such as a 
constitution, which regulate the power structure within the regime, the assignments of 
government functions and the leadership succession (often critical in nondemocratic regimes). 
Institutionalization usually leads to a separation between the military as institution and the 
military as government. In Argentina, Peru and Uruguay the level of institutionalization of the 
military was for instance less than in Chile and Brazil (Aguero, 1998: 386-400). As will be 
shown in the next section this had consequences for the ability of the military to continue to 
have a hold on power during a political transition.  
Thirdly, a distinction can be made between the levels of governance in which the 
military is active and parameters of governmental power. The levels of governance are (1) 
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control, meaning general steering, over otherwise autonomous sectors and organisations, (2) 
direction of those sectors and organisations, and (3) administration of government 
departments, business corporations and trade unions by military officers. The extent to which 
the military holds governmental power depends on the scope of their control, their resources 
base, their mean and efficacy (Finer, 1974: 11). According to Bellin (2004: 148-149) 
militaries will be able to hold their political role as long as they remain fiscally healthy, they 
successfully maintain international support networks and as long as they are not met by 
popular mobilizations which they cannot contain.  
Next to the different forms of military rule and political engagement, a distinction can 
be made between institutionalized (not to be confused with the above described 
institutionalization of the military into an authoritarian regime) and patrimonial political 
militaries. An institutionalized military has a corporate identity separate from the state, while 
the identity of a patrimonial military is integrated with that of an authoritarian regime. 
Institutionalism is here defined by Max Weber’s bureaucratic principles: rule governed, 
predictable, meritocratic, established path of career advancement and recruitment, promotion 
based on performance, not corrupt, has service ethic and strict merit based hierarchy (in 
Bellin, 2004: 145-149). Patrimonial military organisations are driven by cronyism and 
characterized by widespread corruption, abuse of power, patronage, demobilisation of the 
opposition forces and blurred lines between its public and private mission. A patrimonial 
military organisation will therefore be particularly resistant to democratic reform and 
according to O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 33) armed insurrection seems to be the only 
way for regime change in such a case. A more institutionalized military organization will be 
more willing to disengage from power and to allow for political reform and there the route to 
democracy will be likely a pacific and negotiated one (Bellin, 2004: 145-149; O’ Donnell & 
Schmitter, 1986: 33).  
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2.3 The Role of Political Militaries in Transitional Periods  
 
In political transitions, brought about by society led revolutions, history shows that militaries 
have played a crucial role by taking the lead in the transition period; having discretionary 
power over arrangements and rights  (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986: 6; Przeworski, 1986: 60-
61; Stepan, 1986: 78-79; Huntington, 1991a: 36; Miller et al, 2012: 298). The speed and 
nature of the military withdrawal from politics is crucial for the prospects of lasting 
liberalization or democratization. According to Welch (1992) an abrupt retreat of the military 
will lead to the breakdown of an authoritarian regime, while a phased withdrawal will lead to 
a transformation of the political system. A quick collapse of an authoritarian regime most 
likely will lead to a euphoric change of government, with little staying power. That is why 
Alfred Stepan (1986: 75-79) argues that society led revolutions most probably lead to the 
instalment of a new authoritarian successor or a caretaker military junta which promises to 
organize elections and which are not interested in extricating themselves from power. These 
actors will make sure they can still perform their emergency powers.  
 Bellin (2004: 145-146) on the other hand argues that institutionalized military 
establishments have a good reason to believe that their power will not be ruined by political 
reform. They either opt to transfer power to civilians, as they believe this will save the 
institutional integrity of the military establishment, or remain in power by holding elections. 
Bellin (2004: 146) argues that where the military “has successfully delivered on public goals 
like national defence and economic development, it might be confident on its ability to ride 
democratic transition successfully and maintain a hold on power, this time by popular 
election”.  
 The resistance towards democracy of militaries will depend on the degree to which 
they are directly involved in policy-making and repression and on the degree to which they 
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are institutionalized into the authoritarian regime. The military in Italy, Portugal and Spain 
during the seventies was not directly involved in the administrative apparatus of the state and 
not the military, but the police, was responsible for repression. This facilitated their eventual 
acceptance of democratization. In Latin America and Greece there was a direct link between 
the military, the administrative apparatus and repression, making them less willing to allow 
for democratization (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986: 23-34; Aguero, 1998: 385-386). 
However, Aguero (1998: 399-400) argues that “a military will not be able to sustain its power 
and influence in the post-authoritarian regime if this power is not backed with formal-legal 
arrangements”. The more institutionalized military regimes in Chile and Brazil were able to 
define the transition path on their own terms, limiting the aspirations of the opposition, while 
the less institutionalized military regimes in Argentina, Uruguay and Peru had to reach out to 
the opposition in an attempt to retain part of their power (Aguero, 1998: 388-390).  
 O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 34-35) argue that in societies where the military is 
professionalized, has a clear coercive supremacy within its territory and is widely involved in 
the regime the route to political democracy will most likely be a negotiated, pacific and 
incremental one. Only when the military institution realizes that in order to stay in power, 
meaning the power to intervene in matters of importance, it will have to remove itself from 
directly governing the country, the way is open for a civilian government. Such a civilian 
government will however most likely be faced with the continuation of military power in its 
government (Huntington, 1991a: 238-242; Droz-Vincent, 2013: 15; Koonings & Kruijt, 2002: 
29). Examples of this were visible in almost all militarized authoritarian regimes, as in 
Turkey, Portugal, Chile, Brazil, Nicaragua, Peru and Uruguay, where the military continued 
to exert influence and power after a civilian government was elected. The military in those 
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countries for instance insisted on certain provisions within the constitution1, made sure some 
of the actions by the military regime were irreversible2, created new governmental bodies 
which were dominated by the military3, assigned key positions to high military officers4, 
guaranteed its autonomy by not giving the elected government any control over military 
personnel and finances, authorized itself to intervene in politics in case of an emergency, 
banned certain political parties and restricted election procedures5 (Huntington, 1991a: 238-
242; Droz-Vincent, 2013: 15).  
 Adam Przeworski (1986: 60-61) therefore argues that forces in society which are 
trying to bring down an authoritarian regime need to ‘struggle’ on two fronts: the dismantling 
of the old regime and the realization of their interests by organizing themselves and by 
making sure they alter the institutional arrangement in their favour. Thus, the strengths and 
weaknesses of the civil society determine the extent to which the military can demand 
prerogatives once an authoritarian regime is extricated (Stepan, 1986: 75 – 77, Droz-Vincent, 
2013: 13). The power of civil society to create and channel social pressure is therefore 
extremely important in bringing about democratization. The next section discusses how the 
political role of militaries has been diminished over time and presents some recommendations 
on how civilian authorities can install civilian oversight over the military.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The Portuguese constitution of 1976 gave the military de jure veto-power over the National Assembly; the 
Chilean military installed rigid voting requirements for constitutional reforms; the Peruvian military authorized 
itself to intervene in cases of subversion. 	  
2 The Turkish military for instance decreed that former laws could not be changed  
3 For instance the National Security Council in Turkey and in Chile 
4 In Brazil military officers occupied cabinet positions under a civilian president. In Portugal and Turkey a 
military officer became president and struggled over power with the civilian prime minster. In Chile Pinochet 
remained the commander in chief. In Uruguay the president had to be a top military general.  5	  The Chilean military adopted an electoral rule favouring rightist parties and diminished the power of the 
president over the armed forces. The Brazilian military reduced the amount of political parties to two and altered 
the electoral law in their favour. 	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2.4 Getting the Military out of Politics  
 
Militaries have sometimes been effective stewards of democratization, but often have proved 
to be the last institution willing to allow for democratization (Miller et al., 2012: 308). 
Therefore, there seems to be a relation between the military’s departure from governance and 
politics and the process of liberalization and democratization (Cook, 2007: 8). How can a 
civilian government reduce the continued military power after a political transition has taken 
place? The essential factor in a successful transition from authoritarian to democratic rule is 
the establishment of democratic civil-military relations. This is a set of understandings that 
keeps the military safe after it has given up power and implies civilian control over the 
military (Droz-Vincent, 2013: 2). The most significant propositions on how to reform the 
civil-military relations are discussed here: professionalization of the military; protecting the 
interest of the military; letting democracy does it work and; install democratic civil-military 
relations.  
 
2.4.1 Professionalization and Political Neutrality  
 
Huntington (1957) and Janowitz (196) both rely on professionalizing the military as a tool for 
civilian governments to control the military. Huntington (1957: 84) argues that recognizing 
the autonomy of the military profession leads to political neutrality and voluntary 
subordination to civilian control. Janowitz (1960) focuses more on professionalization in the 
occupation, by incorporating values as devotion to community and self-restraint into military 
education, as a way to control the military. 
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 Finer (1962: 24-27) disagrees with Huntington; he argues that some features of 
professionalization actually lead to interventions in politics. Professionalism increases 
military capacity to act decisively and it weakens the authority of a civilian leader. The 
military will see itself as servant of the state rather than of a specific government. 
Professionalization in the Turkish military for instance led to an esprit de corps, sophisticated 
weaponry and fighting capabilities, but not to less political power (Kamrava, 2000: 73). Finer 
(1962: 25) argues that the military must believe in a basic principle: the principle of civil 
supremacy. In countries like Portugal, Spain, Colombia, Paraguay and South Korea militaries 
have permitted civilian authorities to govern.  
Military disengagement is not uncommon, but military neutrality proves to be 
problematic in states where the military has played a political role. They have disengaged, but 
only as long as the civilian authorities live up to their expectations. Often this disengagement 
looks more like indirect intermittent rule than civilian rule. Long-term disengagement 
depends on the mentality of the military leaders and the nature of the society, mainly the 
presence of a developed political culture. In order to arrive at long term disengagement the 
following conditions must be met according to Finer (1974: 15-19): (1) military leaders 
should want their troops to quit politics, (2) civilian leaders have to be able to establish a 
regime which is capable of functioning without military support, (3) the civilian regime 
should be favourable to the armed forces and (4) the armed forces should have sufficient 
confidence in the new civilian leader.  
  
2.4.2 Protecting the Interest of the Military: A Gradual Approach  
 
Hillel Frisch (2013: 167) argues that a democratic transition is more likely to occur if the elite 
manages to negotiate a constitutional framework in which the interest of the military is 
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protected after they cease power, or if they believe that they can continue to hold power by 
being elected to office. Miller et al (2012) agree that giving the military a certain degree of 
prerogatives can be helpful. At the same time the capability of the civilian authorities should 
be empowered to effectively have oversight over the military.  
The diminishing role of the military in Chile, Portugal and Turkey give an example of 
a gradualist approach, where civilian authorities were able to diminish the military’s influence 
over time. In Chile former dictator Pinochet stayed on as commander-in-chief of the army for 
eight more years after the political transition had started. Special prerogatives were built into 
the constitution and only in 2005, twenty-five years after the transition, those prerogatives 
were removed from the constitution. In Portugal the military claimed certain ‘reserved 
domains’ within the constitution: domains over which the military is not accountable to the 
civilian authorities. These ‘reserved domains’ were part of the constitution for eight years 
after the initiation of the transition. In Turkey the military has acted as a pressure group from 
behind the scenes and for a long time held certain prerogatives through the National Security 
Council (Kamrava, 2000: 73; Droz-Vincent, 2013: 17). The role of the military in Turkish 
politics has steadily eroded, although slowly. These examples show that a gradual approach 
may delay the instalment of democracy, but that it does not necessarily prevent 
democratization (Miller et al, 2012: 309-312).  
 
2.4.3 The Working of Democracy  
 
The Latin American and South European experiences show that the working of democracy 
over time reduces the coup attempts by politicized militaries and reduces their power and 
privileges. The militaries became less interested in confronting civilians and overthrowing 
their regimes, as it became more concerned with protecting its institutional well-being and 
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privileges (Huntington, 1991a: 242-243; Droz-Vincent, 2013: 23). Those countries 
experienced an increased transparency in the defence area, greater supervisory over the 
military by its parliaments, replacement of military personnel in the defence ministry by 
civilian officials, a replacement of the top of the military and a more politically neutralized 
military (Huntington, 1995: 11). In order to establish such democratic civil-military relations 
a functioning civilian government is needed, which makes the prospects of returning to an 
authoritarian regime no longer a viable option by institutionalizing democratic control over 
the military and addressing shadow networks (Droz-Vincent, 2013: 18-23). 
 
Democratic Civil-Military Relations 
In order to establish democratic civil-military relations the defence sector needs to be 
reorganized. Huntington (1991a: 242-243; 1995: 11-13), Diamond and Plattner (1996), Pion 
Berlin (2009) and Droz-Vincent (2013: 18-23) mention a few measures a newly elected 
civilian government could take to implement this reorganization, which can be summarized in 
seven points. In the first place a newly elected civilian government could empower the 
ministry of defence by replacing the military officers by civilian officials. Secondly it could 
replace the top of the military by encouraging those in charge during the former regime to 
retire. Thirdly they could install judiciary and legislative control over the military. Fourthly 
they could reduce the manpower and finances of the military. The nation-building role and the 
economic development the military often provides for makes it however hard to cut back on 
their budget. Fifthly they could alter the military training and education system. Sixthly they 
could reorient the military on its core mission, external security, and get the military out of a 
wide range of activities which are not strictly related to the core business of the military. For 
instance by cutting back on their economic role by privatizing military enterprises. In order to 
keep the military satisfied they could instead invest in the modernization of their military 
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equipment and make sure they uphold their respect and status. Either increasing or decreasing 
the economic benefits of the military is an option.  
 Finally international pressure from the United States and the European Union can play 
a major role in democratizing the civil-military relations. Academics (such as Cook, 2007 and 
Droz-Vincent, 2013) agree that the European Union is the primary actor for driving change in 
the civil-military relations in Turkey. Furthermore exposure to the military education in the 
United States has been a factor for acceptance by military officers of liberal democratic norms 
of military professionalism and civilian control (Huntington, 1991a: 242-243; 1995: 11-13).  
 
2.5 Conclusion and Expectations  
 
History shows that in all militarized authoritarian regimes the military took a leading role in 
transitional periods and that the extent to which the military was able to keep its prerogatives 
during the transition had a great affect on the democratization process. From the literature it 
becomes clear that the main factor influencing the extent to which a military is willing to 
disengage from politics and will allow for eventual democratization, is the extent to which the 
military is involved in the authoritarian regime. The more a military is involved in the regime, 
the less it is willing to allow for political reform and democratization.  
 The extent to which a military is involved in a regime is determined by three factors. 
The first is the character of the military institution: patrimonial or institutional. Institutional 
militaries have an identity separate from the regime, while patrimonial militaries are 
identified with the regime. Patrimonial militaries are particularly resistant to democratic 
reform; while an institutionalized military does not necessarily has to see its power ruined by 
political reform. The second factor is the extent to which the military is directly involved in 
the administrative apparatus. The more involved, especially in repression, the less it is willing 
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to allow for democratization. The third factor is the extent to which the position of a military 
is institutionalized, referring to formal legal arrangements. Militaries which ruling is backed 
by a legal framework will trust that they can shape the transition and demand prerogatives. 
This in contrary to militaries which are not backed by a legal framework, which will more 
likely have to negotiate their political maneuverability with the opposition.  
 The other factors determining the extent to which a military will allow for 
democratization are the nature of a transition (abrupt or gradual), the strength of civil society 
and international pressure. When there is an abrupt breakdown of an authoritarian regime and 
a low developed political culture, the chance is high that the transition will lead to the 
installation of a new authoritarian regime or caretaker military junta, while a gradual change 
will increase the chances that the military will disengage from politics over time. Furthermore 
it becomes clear from the literature that the strengths and weakness of the civil and political 
society and the installation of an effective civilian government are extremely important for the 
degree to which the military will be able to continue to rule. Finally international pressure can 
have a positive influence on the installation of democratic civil-military relations.  
 Under which conditions has the military disengaged from power? From the literature 
becomes clear that when the military realizes that in order to stay in power, it has to remove 
itself from directly governing, the way is open for a civilian government. A military 
institution with an institutionalized character will either transfer power to civilians in order to 
save its institutional integrity or try to remain in power by getting elected to office. Civilian 
authorities will be faced with continued military power, as the military will try to circumvent 
civilian oversight over the military, will make sure they can still perform their emergency 
powers and try to shape a political environment which is favorable to them. In the past this 
has been done through the constitution, the creation of new governmental bodies, assigning 
key positions to military officers, banning political parties and restricting elections.  
Egypt: A Case Study 27 	  
	  
 The cases discussed in the literature show that the role of the military will only 
diminish over time, and that the disengagement of the military from politics has taken place in 
an incremental, pacific and negotiated way. From the literature two main conclusions can be 
derived about the conditions under which the military will disengage. The first one being that 
civilian authorities should guarantee the military certain prerogatives in order to keep it 
satisfied. The second being that an effective and strong civilian government is needed in order 
to be able to execute civilian oversight over the military.  
 
CHAPTER III: RESEARCH DESIGN & METHODOLOGY 
This chapter firstly discusses the strengths and limitations of doing a case study. Secondly the 
research design and key indicators for answering the research question are defined. Finally the 
data collection method is explained.  
 
3.1 Case Study: Strengths and Limitations  
 
The research question will be empirically answered by a single-case study on the willingness 
of the Egyptian military to allow for democratization after the ousting of Hosni Mubarak in 
2011. The time frame of the case study is January 25, 2011, the start of the protests calling for 
the fall of the regime, up to June 30, 2013, the deposit of the first civilian elected president 
Mohamed Morsi by the military. The conduct of a case study, a qualitative research method, 
fits the research question best. A case study gives the opportunity to address the historical and 
sociological side of the topic as it focuses on institutions, identities of the actors and 
preferences. Case studies furthermore give the opportunity to test implications from theories 
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against empirical observations and to use those results to add new insights to the existing 
theory (George & Bennett, 2005: 5; Boeije, 2005: 17-27). A case study is the ultimate method 
for exploring complex causalities and for retaining a holistic and meaningful interpretation of 
real-life events (Yin, 2009: 4). Its strength is in the first place that it provides for a high level 
of conceptual validity, as it takes in contextual factors. Secondly, as a case study is theory-
laden but not theory-determined it is possible to derive new hypotheses from the case. It can 
as well test deductive theories, suggest new variables that need to be incorporated and refine a 
theory. Thirdly a case study allows for exploring the causal mechanisms in detail (George & 
Bennett, 2005: 9-22, 111). 
 The limitation of doing a case study is the small-n, of which the consequence is that 
the research findings cannot be generalized to all cases. Especially a single case study has this 
limitation. Furthermore case studies can only make tentative conclusions on how much a 
variable affects the outcome (George & Bennett, 2005: 22-34). At the same time “case studies 
are stronger in identifying the scope of conditions of theories and assessing arguments about 
causal necessity in particular cases” (George & Bennett, 2005: 27). In this research I 
deliberately choose to do a single case study as the Egyptian case is as well a theoretical as a 
social relevant case. In Egypt the military is both highly institutionalized, as highly rooted in 
the regime. Based on the former you might expect that the Egyptian military will be willing to 
allow for democratization, while from the latter you might expect that the military officers 
will be highly resistant to any form of democratization. Exploring this case can add relevant 
insights to the existing literature on the role of militaries in transition periods. 
 Furthermore as a general theory on the willingness of political militaries to allow for 
democratization is lacking, the theoretical framework of chapter two is mainly based on 
empirical literature from other cases where the military has taken a leading role in the 
political transition. Based on these cases scholars have determined some indicators that have 
Egypt: A Case Study 29 	  
	  
an effect on the willingness of a political military to allow for democratization. Those 
indicators will be used in order to examine if the military in Egypt acted as can be expected 
based on indicators which determined the military’s behaviour in other cases. This means that 
no formal theory testing will be done, but rather that the case of Egypt will be compared to 
the other cases discussed in chapter two. This narrows down the limitations of doing a single-
case study.  
 
3.2 Research Methods & Key Indicators  
 
The method that will be used is a congruence single case study. A congruence case study 
assesses whether the expectations from the theory can explain or predict the outcome of a 
case (George & Bennett, 2005: 181). In other words:  
“The investigator observes values on the independent and dependent variable within a 
particular case and observes the world (without doing further case studies) to ascertain values 
on the independent and dependent variable that are typical in most other cases. The 
investigator then deduces from these observations and from the test theory expected relative 
values for the independent and dependent variable in the study case and measures the
 congruence or incongruence between expectation and observation” (Van Evera, 1997: 58).  
 
In this research the dependent variable (DV) is the willingness of the military to allow for 
democratization during a political transition. From the theoretical framework it has become 
clear that there are several variables which determine the extent to which a military is willing 
to allow for democratization. For this reason no single independent variable has been set, but 
several variables influencing the dependent variable are distinguished. These variables are the 
character of the military, the military involvement in the authoritarian regime, the character of 
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the society, especially the degree to which a civil and political society has been developed, the 
nature of the transition and the presence of international pressure. This study will test whether 
the Egyptian military, based on the expectations that can be derived from the literature, acts in 
congruence or incongruence with these expectations. The relationship between the 
independent variables and the dependent variable is shown in figure 2.   
 
Figure 2: Relationship between independent variables and dependent variable (DV) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
The case study will be divided into two parts. The first part will examine the values of the 
independent variables. Based on these measures in relation to the theoretical framework, 
expectations on the willingness of the military to allow for democratization in Egypt are 
derived. The second part of the case study will examine the extent to which the military has 
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been willing to allow for democratization since the ousting of Mubarak in the beginning of 
2011 until the disposition of the first elected civilian president Mohamed Morsi on June 30, 
2013.  
 Democratization can be defined as the process of applying democratic principles and 
procedures to state institutions. These democratic principles and procedures include 
accountability of institutions, free and fair elections and a set of political and civil rights 
(O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986: 8; Stepan, 1988: 6; Huntington, 1991a: 9). The extent to 
which the military has allowed for democratization will be measured on the basis of two 
indicators: representation and accountability. These indicators are as well part of the level of 
democracy measures employed by Freedom House and the International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). Freedom House (2014) uses civil liberties and 
political rights as measures. International IDEA (Landman et al, 2008) uses a much broader 
range of indicators, of which the most important are incorporated in the two indicators used 
here. Although civil liberties are often incorporated in democracy measurements, this study 
limits itself to looking especially at applying representation and accountability measures to 
state institutions and political actors.  
 
Accountability  - Accountability refers to the implementation of procedures and rules for 
executive institutional accountability. This will be assessed on basis of the three written 
constitutions which have been adopted since 2011, the removal or reinstitution of martial law, 
the transfer of power to a civilian government, the transfer of key positions to civilian 
officials and civilian control over the military budget and personnel.  
 
 
Representation – Representation refers to divide of power between civilian, judicial and 
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military institutions. Part of representation is the organization of free, competitive and 
periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and all adult population is 
eligible to vote. This will be measured by looking at freedom of political party competition 
and the conduct of free and fair elections. Secondly the mandate of the different 
representative institutions, as the parliament and presidency will be assessed.  
 
 3.3 Data Collection and Analysis  
 
The values of the indicators and variables in the Egyptian case will be measured by using a 
wide range of as well primary as secondary sources. Primary sources are the three 
constitutions, official statements made by the military and the laws adopted under the rule of 
the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF). Secondary sources will primarily consist of 
existing literature on the role of the military in Egypt, reports of governmental and non-
governmental organizations, analyses issued by think tanks and news reports on the situation 
in Egypt.  
 The structure of the analysis of the case is based on the operationalization set out in 
this chapter. Chapter four will analyze the values of the independent variables in the case of 
Egypt and on basis of this exploration expectations of the willingness of the military to allow 
for democratization are set. Chapter five analyses the extent to which the military has been 
willing to allow for democratization based on the key indicators set in the second section of 
this chapter.  
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CHAPTER IV: CASE BACKGROUND  
 
This chapter explores the values of the independent variables introduced in the second 
paragraph of chapter three. In order to get a comprehensive understanding of the case, the 
historical background and political system of Egypt will be introduced at first. Secondly, the 
civil-military relations in Egypt before the ousting of Mubarak in 2011 will be explored. 
Thirdly the strength of the civil society, the nature of the popular uprising and pressure 
possibilities of international actors will be discussed. Finally, empirical expectations will be 
derived from the discussed subjects.   
 
4.1 Historical Background of Egypt  
 
The modern Egyptian state owes its genesis to the military (Kamrava, 2000: 73). On July 23, 
1952 the Free Officers, midlevel Egyptian army officers, committed a coup d’état by ousting 
king Farouk, dissolving the parliament and outlawing political parties. The officers under the 
leadership of general Gamal Abdel Nasser concentrated the political power in their hands 
(Cook, 2007: 63-65; Karawan, 2011: 44). Nasser enjoyed great popular legitimacy in a decade 
where nationalism was on the rise. He embodied the Arab nationalism; known as pan-
Arabism and under Nasser Egypt became one of the leading countries in the region 
(Woltering, 2013). In 1970 Nasser died from a heart attack and was succeeded by Mohammed 
Anwar al-Sadat. Sadat was a senior officer of the Free Officers and served twice as vice 
president under Nasser. He is known for his economic liberalisation, pact with Western allies 
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and peace with Israel. Sadat reformed the Egyptian economy by privatizing factories, 
decreasing food subsidies, which lead to the famous bread riots in 1977, and raising the VAT 
(Karawan, 2011: 44). The economic reforms resulted in more unemployment, more inequality 
and the raise of corruption. As a consequence Islamic organisations gained more support, 
because of their charity work for the poor (Woltering, 2013). 
On October 6, 1981, Sadat was assassinated by a group of men who were linked to the 
Islamic Jihad (the New York Times, 2011). Hosni Mubarak, vice president under Sadat from 
1975 until his death, succeeded Sadat as president. Mubarak was a career officer in the 
Egyptian Air Force, serving as commander from 1972 until 1975. Mubarak continued to 
reform the economy in line with Sadat’s earlier reforms: he further privatized state assets, 
encouraged foreign investment, cut further on subsidies and state expenditures. The 
privatization of enterprises mainly ended up in the hands of crony capitalists and led to the 
formation of a business elite, people who were well-connected to the political regime. 
Especially after 2004 privatization was accelerated (Cause III; Droz-Vincent, 2011: 10-12). 
The majority of the Egyptian people barely profited from the economic reforms. The 
inequality between poor and rich increased. Data from the World Bank (2014) shows that the 
16,7% of the population living at the poverty line in 2000 had increased to 25,2% in 2011.  
The rise of mass media as Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya, Internet access and access of a 
larger group of youngsters to the universities led to greater societal awareness. Furthermore 
the fact that one fourth of Egypt’s population is between 18 and 29 years old and the youth 
unemployment rate is 25% (age between 15 and 24) (UNDP, 2010; CIA, 2010) has led to 
growing youth activism since 2000 (Droz-Vincent, 2011: 10-12). The desperate socio-
economic circumstances, the gap between the ruling (business) elite and the majority of the 
Egyptian population, corruption and the widespread brutal repression and torture by the 
security forces were the main reasons people took the streets on January 25, 2011, the day of 
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Police, and called for bread, freedom and social justice and no to corruption (Droz-Vincent, 
2011: 10-15). This ultimately led to the ouster of Mubarak on February 10, 2011 by the 
Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF).  
 
4.2 Egypt’s Political System  
 
Egypt’s political system from 1952 until 2011 can be best described as hybrid/authoritarian: 
democratic institutions and civic organisations coexisted with repression and co-optation by 
the regime. Multiparty politics for example was accepted, as long as the opposition parties did 
not pose a serious threat to the ruling establishment. Opposition parties which were seen as 
serious competitors were suppressed and outlawed (Miller et al., 2012: 80-85).  
 
4.2.1 Accountability and Representation  
 
Political parties  
After 1977 a law enabled the establishment of political parties. Until than only one party was 
allowed, which was renamed the National Democratic Party (NDP) in 1978 (Cook, 2007: 69). 
Establishing a new party proved however to be difficult. Political parties were not allowed to 
have a religious basis, excluding the Muslim Brotherhood, or to be similar to existing parties, 
excluding liberal democratic parties (Miller et al, 2012: 91-92). The Committee for Affairs of 
Political Parties further restricted the establishment and manoeuvrability of political parties. 
This committee was dominated by members of the ruling NDP and had the power to decide 
on the applications of political parties, to shut down a party or to suspend its activities (Cook, 
2007: 69-71). The political parties that were allowed became co-opted by the regime (Miller 
et al, 2012: 91-92).  
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Representative Institutions: the People’s Assembly, Shura Council and Presidency   
The Egyptian political system has three official representative institutions which are elected 
by secret balloting. These institutions are the People’s Assembly, the Shura Council and the 
presidency. The People’s Assembly, Egypt’s lower house consisted of 518 members in 2010. 
Ten of the members were appointed by the president, the rest, mainly independent candidates, 
were elected by popular vote. The members served for a six-year term (Freedom House, 2011; 
Polity IV, 2010). The People’s Assembly had a legislative function and was tasked with 
overseeing the functioning of the government, the government’s budget, and had the right to 
question ministers and initiate discussions. They were furthermore endowed with the right to 
withdraw confidence in the cabinet and to nominate a president (Cook, 2007: 63-65). In 
practice the People’s Assembly was an extension of the regime. Questioning of ministers and 
nominating a president have been rare. Furthermore the Assembly had no say in important 
policy areas, only less important areas such as agriculture, local policy, youth and the 
bourgeoisie (Polity IV, 2010). 
The lower house has been consistently dominated by the NDP and retired military 
officers. The NDP was financed by the regime, had unlimited access to state media and was 
backed by electoral laws and fraud, severely limiting the influence of opposition parties 
(Cook, 2007: 70). The electoral law furthermore decreed that half of the seats in the People’s 
Assembly should be reserved for ‘farmers’ and ‘workers’. In reality 90 per cent of those 
‘farmers’ and ‘workers’ were retired military officers and security personnel who 
subsequently took seat in the Defence and National Security Committee, the only committee 
that nominally was tasked with overseeing the military budget (Martini & Taylor, 2011).   
The second ‘representative’ institution is the Shura Council, better known as Egypt’s 
Upper House. The upper house has a consultative function and has 264 members of which 
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two third are directly elected and one third is appointed by the president (Cook, 2007: 68). 
The upper house is tasked with ratifying constitutional amendments and international treaties. 
It has consultative tasks on the subjects of drafts, bills and on all general policies. Like the 
People’s Assembly the Shura Council has been dominated by the NDP (Freedom House, 
2011).  
The third officially representative institution is the presidency, which after 1967 
became the most significant actor in Egypt’s political system. The constitution of 1971 
formally restricted the presidency to two terms of six years. Those restrictions were revoked 
in the amended constitution of 1980, giving the presidency an unlimited term (Cook, 2007: 
72). Under pressure of the Bush administration multiparty presidential elections were for the 
first time organized in 2005 (Droz-Vincent, 2011: 9). Constitutional amendments made it 
however very difficult for other candidates than Mubarak himself, to run for presidential 
elections. First of all only political parties which had been established for more than five years 
and had obtained at least 3% of the seats in as well the People’s Assembly as the Shura 
Council were allowed to put forward a candidate. Secondly, independent candidates needed at 
least 250 signatures from regime officials from different government layers in order to be able 
to run (Egypt’s State Information Service (ESIS), 2009). The majority of government 
institutions were dominated by the ruling NDP party, leaving the other candidates no chance 
of winning (Cook, 2007: 72; Droz-Vincent, 2011: 9).   
 
4.2.2 Law and Rights  
 
Civil and Political Liberties  
In both the constitutions of 1956 and 1971 political and civil rights were formally granted to 
Egypt’s population. Included in the constitutions are equality for the law, the right of freedom 
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of opinion, expression, press, assembly and association and the right to vote (ESIS, 2009). 
However, since 1967 the emergency law has been almost continuously in place, stripping 
citizens from most of their constitutional rights (UNDP, 2005). Newspapers were subjected to 
censorship and even to prison terms and heavy fines for publishing misinformation, workers 
were forbidden to strike and political organizations were only allowed to assemble with the 
approval of the Ministry of Interior (Cook, 2007: 71-71; Karawan, 2011: 45). Political 
activists have been tried under the Emergency law and been detained without charge. 
Furthermore the state has repressed and detained journalists and bloggers (Freedom House, 
2006; 2011).  
   
Independency of the judiciary  
The constitution formally established the independence of judiciary. During the years the 
judiciary has fought to remain independent, although the Ministry of Justice has controlled 
promotions and compensation of the judiciary, favouring judges that deliver favourable 
verdicts (Freedom House, 2011; Stacher, 2012). The emergency law has led to the installation 
of a parallel judicial system, referring civilians to the Supreme State Security Court and from 
1992 to military courts. Those courts have initially been established to trial crimes related to 
national security, for instance terrorism. Because of the judiciary’s fight to remain 
independent, the state started to heavily rely on its military courts. Military courts lack basic 
guarantees as the right to appeal (Cook, 2007: 71-71; Karawan, 2011: 45). Furthermore 
military judiciaries have been appointed directly by the president and verdicts have been 
subject to ratification by the president (Freedom House, 2011).  
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4.3 Civil-Military Relations in Egypt  
 
The military has been a privileged group in Egypt since the sixties, as senior officers served in 
high executive functions (Frisch, 2013: 183). Furthermore the military gained a number of 
significant economic functions since the seventies, which made them economic actors in their 
own right (Kamrava, 2000: 80). Placed in Finer’s (1962) typology, the Egyptian regime could 
be defined as quasi-civilianized direct military rule under Nasser and as indirect continuous 
military rule under Sadat and Mubarak. Under Nasser the military was directly involved in 
governing, but after the defeat of the military in the 1967 war with Israel, the military’s 
political role was downsized (Springborg, 1987: 5; Cook, 2007: 63; Karawan, 2011: 44). The 
proportion of politicians with a military background decreased from 66 per cent in 1967 to 15 
per cent in 1975 (Karawan, 2011: 45). Furthermore in 1980 less than five regional governors 
had a military background, contrary to 22 of the 26 governors in 1964. Under Nasser the 
military was the strongest element of the political system (Springborg, 1987: 5-6). Under 
Sadat and Mubarak the military did dominate the political system, but did not directly govern 
(Cook, 2007: 64; Karawan, 2011: 44). However, in the latest round of Mubarak’s 
appointments of governors in 2008 20 of the 28 governors had a military or security 
background (Miller et al, 2012: 82; Martini & Taylor, 2011).  
The military dominated political system becomes visible in four ways. In the first 
place all four Egypt’s presidents until 2011 have been hauled from the military and were both 
president and Supreme Commander of the military. The presidency has been the most 
important institutionalization of the military in the regime. “It’s the military’s crucial and 
intimate association with the presidency that ensure the continuity of Egypt’s political system 
(…) this mutually reinforcing relationship with the president has allowed the officers to 
40 The Role of the Military in Political Transitions   	  
	  
remove themselves from day to day governance” (Cook, 2007: 73). In the second place the 
military dominated system becomes visible through the multiple officers who have held high-
ranking political and bureaucratic positions, as cabinet members, members of parliament or as 
regional governors. In the third place the ministry of defence and the Defence and National 
Security Committee consisted mainly of retired military and police officers. This way the 
military had a major influence on foreign and security policy. In the fourth place it becomes 
visible through the vast economic complex which the military owns (Albrecht & Bishara, 
2011; Cook, 2007: 18).  
Through those four structures, the Egyptian officers have been able to rule without 
having to govern. They served as the ultimate backbone of the regime. The democratic 
‘façade’ and authoritarian institutions ensured their predominance and satisfied the military’s 
demands: political influence and economic privileges (Cook, 2007: 2, 8; Albrecht & Bishara, 
2011: 14, 18; Droz-Vincent, 2011: 18). There has however always been a fine, but essential, 
line between military integrated in the political regime and military as institutional part of the 
state. The military as corps did not have a direct political role, only the military top held 
executive positions within the regime (Droz-Vincent, 2011: 6, 18). The military as corps is 
highly institutionalized, professionalized and has a strong sense of corporatism (Droz-
Vincent, 2011: 18). Furthermore it consists of Egyptians from all layers in society, as the 
Egyptian military has service obligation for all Egyptian males between the age of 18 to 30 
for a year and a half up to three years and a nine-year reserve obligation (CIA, 2010; Azzam, 
2012: 2).  
After 1967 the Egyptian presidents started to keep a close eye on the military and have 
only relied on a few high ranking officers in executive positions (Droz-Vincent, 2011: 7). 
Especially Mubarak weakened the military establishment compared to his predecessors. He 
invested in the security forces of the Ministry of Interior: the police and the intelligence 
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services (Droz-Vincent, 2011: 10-12). As the military was not directly involved in the ‘dirty 
task’ of repression and torture by the security forces, except for the suppression of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in 1997, it has never been target of widespread criticism. The military enjoys a 
certain degree of popularity among the Egyptian public as it is seen as the victorious force of 
the 1973 war with Israel and as the guardian of the people (Droz-Vincent, 2011: 18 & 2013: 
6). In order to keep the military satisfied and in its ‘barracks’ Mubarak invested in large 
military budgets, modernization programs and economic activities (Droz-Vincent, 2011: 10-
12). 
Mubarak further distanced the military by not offering former high-ranking officers 
the position of prime minister, probably because he did not want to create a successor of 
himself within the military ranks (Frisch, 2013: 183). In most of the recent published 
academic articles on the role of the military in Egypt the succession of Mubarak by his son 
Gamal is mentioned as an imminent threat to the military (Cook, 2007; Barany, 2011; 
Albercht & Bishara, 2011; Fischer, 2013). Four months before the 25 January demonstration 
the New York Times published an article which stated that “the single most powerful 
institution” was facing its “toughest test in decades, an imminent presidential succession” 
(Cambanis, 2010). The military despised Gamal Mubarak, as he never served in the military, 
was part of the business class and in their eyes incapable of understanding and managing the 
country (Barany, 2011: 32).  
 Gamal Mubarak joined the ruling National Democratic Party in 2000 and was 
appointed head of policies secretariat, a board of businessman and liberal economist. With 
Gamal assuming power the military would see its political influence diminishing (Frisch, 
2013: 187). Furthermore the economic agenda of Gamal was based on macro economic 
stabilization and mainly focused on benefits for the business elite. This threatened the 
economic interests of the military, which is committed to the economic ideas of Nasser; a 
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state controlled economy (Albrecht & Bishara, 2011: 18). According to the article in the New 
York Times military officers feared that Gamal would “erode the military’s institutional 
powers” (Cambanis, 2010).  
 
4.3.1 The Military’s Economic Interests  
 
Since the seventies there has been a horizontal expansion of the military into the national 
economy. In the eighties the budget of the military was reduced, therefore the military started 
to look for funding through other channels. Facilitated by the government the military 
assumed activities in the market place through military organizations and companies, under 
the supervision of the Ministry of Military Production (Barany, 2011: 32; Frish, 2013: 183-
186). The military did not only assume economic activities in the field of military and security 
production, but as well production geared towards the civilian market. The military industrial 
enterprise exists of weapon production, agricultural machines, cables, medications, pumps, 
ovens, water management, production of electricity, land development deals, services in 
aviation and a share in the tourism sector (Cook, 2007: 18; Albrecht & Bishara, 2011: 14; 
Frisch, 2013: 183-186). They are even involved in the production of olive oil, bottled spring 
water and the export of refrigerators (Cambanis, 2010). The military holds a vast economic 
complex from which military officers profit through relatively high salaries and other 
economic privileges, as free medical care, foreign travel allowances, subsidized housing and 
duty free imports (Kamrava, 2000: 80-81; Barany, 2011: 32).  
 The extent of the military’s economic empire in relation to the country’s gross 
domestic product (GDP) remains unknown, as the military’s budget has never been subjected 
to state control (Cook, 2007: 18; Albrecht & Bishara, 2011: 14; Barany, 2011: 32). The 
estimates differ from 20% up to 40% of Egypt’s GDP (Ashour, 2013). The extensive 
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economic network has turned the military into a financial and industrial force. Mehran 
Kamrava already in 2000 noted that: “With their political and economic interest firmly 
grounded into the status quo, overthrowing the seemingly civilianized military rulers becomes 
exceedingly difficult, while at the same time compelling those in power to fend off potential 
challengers with even greater zeal” (Kamrava, 2000: 81).  
 
4.4 Egypt’s Civil and Political Society  
 
Under Mubarak the amount of registered nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) has 
increased from 12.000 in 1991 to 16.800 in 2011 (Miller et al, 2012: 81). Egypt’s NGO’s 
have however not been effective in channelling the main interests and demands of the society. 
This is in the first place caused by the either religious or secular basis of the NGO’s. The 
former promote Islamization of society, while the latter advocates for the banning of religious 
expression in public life. Instead of working together, these NGO’s have excluded each other 
(Miller et al, 2012: 89-91). Secondly, civic organizations have been subjected to state control. 
In 2002 a law decreed that all NGO’s had to be apolitical, that their activities would be 
monitored by the Ministry of Social Affairs and that they had to report on their membership 
composition and sources of funding. The law restricts international funding and allows the 
government to dissolve a NGO at any time (Abdalla, 2008: 25-28).  
 The only civic and political organisation that has posed serious threats to the 
established regime was the Muslim Bortherhood, the Ikhwan. In order to reduce their 
organized demonstrations and strikes and to decrease the support for more extreme and 
militant Islamist organizations the regime decided to accommodate the brotherhood during 
the eighties (Cook, 2007: 76-80). The brotherhood was not formally legalized, but was 
allowed to preach, organize and mobilize. The unintended consequence was however that the 
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brotherhood gained more support and significant political power (Cook, 2007: 76-88). In 
1992 the Muslim Brotherhood succeeded to form the largest opposition group of independent 
candidates affiliated with the Ikhwan in the lower house (Cook, 2007: 80-89). Especially the 
Brotherhood’s success in infiltrating university boards and professional syndicates posed a 
threat to the regime (Campagna, 1996: 290-291). The regime ended the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s accommodated position in 1992 and leaders and political activists of the 
brotherhood were referred to the Supreme State Security court and later on to military 
tribunals (Cook, 2007: 80-91).  
 Due to the brotherhood’s success the regime adopted a series of laws to make it even 
harder for opposition groups to demand political reform. Financing from abroad became 
illegal, syndicates were placed under judicial supervision, the autonomy of the universities 
was terminated and municipal elections were terminated (Cook, 2007: 91). In 2005 the 
Muslim Brotherhood made a comeback by winning 87 seats in the People’s Assembly. Their 
comeback was however short-lived. In 2006 the regime again cracked down on the 
brotherhood, preventing it from running for the Shura Council elections and for the municipal 
elections which were reinstated in 2008. Members were detained and got long-term prison 
sentences. In the 2010 election for the lower house, the Muslim brotherhood won no seats 
(Freedom House, 2011).  
 As has been mentioned in 4.1 recent years have seen a rising of youth activism due to 
an increase of Internet access and the rise of Arabic mass media. Calls for demonstrations on 
January 25, 2011, the first day of the Egyptian uprising, were made through Facebook groups 
of which the most significant were the April 6th Movement, ‘We Are All Khalid Sa’id’, and 
‘Youth for Justice and Freedom’. The Kifaya Movement, a movement that already in 2004 
protested for the step-down of Mubarak (Freedom House, 2006) and several syndicates joined 
those groups on January 25. Clearly missing in the initial demonstrations were the opposition 
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parties, as for instance the Tagammu and the Muslim Brotherhood (the Muslim Brotherhood 
joined on January 28) (Miller et al., 2012: 92-96). 
 The April 6th movement and Kifaya (Enough) were the only movements which had 
organized civil disobedience before. On April 6th, 2008 the April 6th movement supported the 
textile workers strikes in the industrial town El-Mahalla El-Kubra. In 2009 it again organized 
strikes, but those were less successful (Miller et al, 2012: 93). The ‘We Are All Khalid Sa’id’ 
Facebook group was established by Wael Ghoneim, Google executive in Egypt, in response 
to blatantly police brutality. Police officers beat Khalid Sa’id to death, after he tried to upload 
pictures of police splitting a drug bust. The group attracted more than 200.000 members in the 
first ten days (Miller et al, 2012: 95). These online communities can be more seen as social 
movements, rather than organized civic organizations.  
 
4.5 Nature of Transition  
 
On January 25, 2011 nonviolent demonstrations erupted in Cairo and other major Egyptian 
cities, calling for reforms. Demonstrators came from all sectors of society, crossing 
ideological, socio-economic and secterian lines. The New York Times reported on January 25, 
2011 hat “the protests represented the largest display of popular dissatisfaction in recent 
memory, perhaps since 1977” (Fahim & El-Naggar, 2011). The masses grew during the days 
and on January 28 the Muslim Brotherhood officially joined the demonstrations. Police forces 
clashed with the demonstrators, but could not contain the demonstrations any longer, as they 
were overran by the protestors. On January 29, 2011 Mubarak ordered a nationwide 
deployment of the military (Albrecht & Bishara, 2011: 15; Droz-Vincent, 2011: 15). The 
military was deployed, but on January 31, 2011 field marshal and minister of defence Husayn 
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Tantawi declared that the military will not use force against protestors and that the military 
recognizes the legitimacy of the protestor’s demands (Reuters, 2011).     
 On February 11, 2011 the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF)6 intervened 
and announced that it would protect ‘what the protestors have achieved’ and would oversee a 
transition to a new constitution, free elections and an eventual end to the state of emergency 
(New York Times, 2011). Mubarak resigned and was replaced by field marshal Husayn 
Tantawi, minister of defence since 1991 and Commander of the Armed Froces.   
 The eruption of mass demonstrations and consequently ousting of president Mubarak 
was rather abrupt than gradual. The size, cross-class and nonviolent character of the 
demonstrations proved to be political game changers. Like in Tunisia, but unlike in Syria and 
Bahrain, the Egyptian military declined to use lethal force against protestors. The question if 
the military would shoot had the world at the edge of its seat at the beginning of 2011 (Bellin, 
2011: 134). Apparently the SCAF decided that shooting at such a large group of protestors 
was even less in their interest than saving Mubarak. It would have undermined their 
institutional integrity as “Egypt’s conscript army has so many ties to society at large that, 
even had the generals been willing to shoot demonstrators, many officers and enlisted men 
would probably have refused to obey such an order” (Barany, 2011: 32). Furthermore it 
would have undermined their prestige and national legitimacy as defender of the nation 
(Bellin, 2011: 132; Azzam, 2012: 3).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  The SCAF consisted of nineteen military officers who had not played an active role in the making of 
political decisions before the uprising on January 25, 2011. The SCAF had existed before the uprising, 
but only met on irregular basis to discuss political issues on which it made recommendations to the 
president (Albrecht and Bishara, 2011).  
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4.6 International Actors  
 
From the seventies on Egypt has been the United State’s second main ally in the Middle East. 
As a consequence of signing the peace treaty with Israel, Egypt has received 1.3 billion dollar 
a year in military aid and 450 million dollar in economic support funds since 1979. The 1.3 
billion dollar in military aid is intended for the operation and modernization of Egypt’s 
military and includes a reciprocal commitment from Egypt to the United States (Cook, 2007: 
145; Barany, 2011: 32; Droz-Vincent, 2011: 7). Martini and Taylor (2011) have indicated that 
the financial aid covers 80 per cent of the military’s procurement costs. Furthermore Egyptian 
military officers receive training in the Unites State’s war colleges, fostering close 
relationships between American and Egyptian military officers (Abul-Magd, 2013).  
  
4.7 Conclusions and Empirical Expectations  
 
Based on the character of the military, the civil-military relations and the contextual factors in 
Egypt prior to the ousting of Mubarak, expectations can be derived on the willingness of the 
Egyptian military to allow for democratization during the political transition.  
 Due to as well an institutionalized as a patrimonial character of the Egyptian armed 
forces, it has to be seen which direction the military chooses. The patrimonial character of 
those linked to the regime suggests that the officers will be resistant to democratization. The 
officers have however not been linked by blood or ethnicity to Mubarak, so they might allow 
for some degree of democratization which does not threaten their interests. At the same time 
the Egyptian military has not been directly involved in governing and repressing the 
population, which makes them more willing to allow for democratization. Lastly the military 
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has not been backed by a legal framework, but by the emergency law. If they want to continue 
to play a role in politics they might seek to legitimize their political rule within a new 
constitution or by extending the emergency law.   
 The main obstacle for installing democratic civil-military relations in Egypt seems to 
be its weak civil and political society. Furthermore the ousting of Mubarak has been quite 
abrupt. Both factors increase the likelihood of the formation of a caretaker military junta or 
the installation of an authoritarian leader. International pressure by the United States could 
play a role during the transition, but is limited due the fact that America’s financial aid is 
based on the condition that Egypt maintains its peace with Israel.  
 Taking both the extent to which the military is involved in the regime and the 
contextual factors together the most likely outcome would be that the military seeks to restore 
its privileged position under Mubarak. In the past the military has been comfortable with 
staying out of the daily governing of the country. It will probably seek to regain the 
construction between Mubarak and the military; a construction in which it can still rule from 
behind the scenes.  
 Another factor which could play a decisive role in the Egyptian case, but less in cases 
discussed in the theoretical framework, is the economic interest of the military. The military 
might be willing to give up some political power as long as their economical power is not 
impaired.  
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CHAPTER V: THE MILITARY IN EGYPT’S TRANSITION 
“The generals who were given a free hand to steer the transition in February 2011 did so in a 
way that guarded their institutional interests. No one should have expected the military to 
give up its institutional self-interest” (Brown, 2013: 56).  
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter will discuss the extent to which the military has been willing to allow for 
democratization since it took a leading role in the transition on February 11, 2011. The 
chapter will be constructed along the lines of the key indicators for measuring 
democratization: (1) accountability (the constitutions) and (2) representation (political parties, 
elections, the parliament and the president). In discussing those indicators the emphasis will 
be on the role of the military.  
 
5.2 Egypt’s Transition  
 
The first step the SCAF undertook after the ousting of Mubarak was suspending the 1971 
constitution and dissolving the People’s Assembly and Shura Council on February 13, 2011. 
In its statement on February 13 it stated that the SCAF had the intention to “temporarily 
administer the affairs of the country for a period of six months or until People’s Assembly, 
Shura Council and Presidential elections are held” (The New York Times, 2011). The 
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statement concluded that in the transitional period the SCAF would issue laws and that the 
government of Ahmed Mohamed Shafiq would continue to work until a new government 
would be formed. Elections were to be held for the People’s Assembly, the Shura council and 
the Presidency. The SCAF furthermore installed a body of legal experts to amend the articles 
regulating presidential elections of the 1971 constitution (Lang, 2013).  
 The amendments to the constitution were put to a popular vote by a referendum on 
March 19, 2011, and with a voter turnout of 41% the amendments were passed with 77% of 
the votes in favour (Ahram Online, 2011). Two weeks later the SCAF however issued its own 
constitutional declaration granting itself all legislative and executive powers (Albrecht & 
Bishara, 2011: 16-17). The initially planned elections for the lower and upper house within 
three months were held nine months later in November 2011 and January 2012. The SCAF 
remained the executive and legislative power for over fifteen months after the ouster of 
Mubarak, until the presidential elections in June 2012. The SCAF shared its legislative power 
with a cabinet it appointed, of which many ministers remained the same ones as under the rule 
of Mubarak (Miller et al, 2012: 96-99). Civilians played a limited role in directing the 
transition, leading to regular protests against the ‘military regime’ (Elshami, 2011; Sayigh, 
2013). In the meantime the Brotherhood was willing to compromise and negotiate with the 
generals and entered a tacit deal with the SCAF. In return for ceasing its protest it gained 
political rights (Albrecht & Bishara, 2011: 23; Stacher, 2012). The Muslim Brotherhood has 
subsequently backed the SCAF by boycotting protests, calling those protests illegitimate and 
by organizing pro-government demonstrations (Martini & Taylor, 2011). The SCAF and 
police forces have brutally oppressed the anti-government demonstrations and detained many 
protestors without charge, leading Amnesty International (2011) to declare the human rights 
situation in Egypt in 2011 worse than under Mubarak.  
Egypt: A Case Study 51 	  
	  
 In the months ahead of the parliamentary elections several liberal groups demanded 
that the constitution would be written first, as they preferred a nonpartisan constitutional 
college and feared that elections would lead to Islamists domination in the drafting process 
(Albrecht & Bishara, 2011: 23). The SCAF was not willing to change their schedule, but 
interim deputy prime minister Selmy took the task upon itself of drafting a list of fundamental 
principles which would be guiding in the writing of the new constitution by the constitutional 
assembly (Sayigh, 2011). The draft version was circulated in November 2011 and granted the 
military a ‘supra-constitutional status’ (Elshami, 2011). The document and the impending 
parliamentary elections lead to mass protests across Cairo in November 2011. This prompted 
the interim civilian government of Prime Minister Esam Sharaf to resign (Elshami, 2011). 
The SCAF appointed Kamal al-Ganzouri, former prime minister under Mubarak, as new 
prime minister and promised to organize presidential elections in June 2012, instead of April 
2013. It did however not reject the Selmy document officially and it has tried to retain its 
most important provisions (Sayigh, 2013).  
 The elections for the lower and upper house at the end of 2011 and beginning of 2012 
were broadly perceived as being free and fair, despite the SCAF’s manipulation and role as 
gatekeeper (Freedom House, 2012; Stacher, 2012; IFES, 2013). Participation was broad, there 
was less restrain on the registration of political parties and voter turnouts for the lower house 
were historically high for Egypt (65% in first round, 43% in second round, 62% in third round) 
(IFES, 2013; Azzam, 2012; Irshad, 2012). The Islamists parties mainly profited as they won 
with 75% in the lower house and with 60% in the upper house (Azzam, 2012: 4; Stacher, 
2012). The electoral triumph was however short-lived. In April and June 2012 the Supreme 
Constitutional Court (SCC) declared first the upper and subsequently the lower house 
elections unconstitutional, leading to the dissolution of both houses (Droz-Vincent, 2013: 16).  
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  In May and June 2012 presidential elections took place, in which Mohamed Morsi, 
the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate, won 51,7% of the votes in the second round 
(International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), 2013). Under Morsi a new 
constitution was drafted and the top military generals were retired and appointed new 
positions within the cabinet (Freedom House, 2013). Morsi’s inability to unite the different 
political fractions, the severe economic circumstances and his power grab, led to public unrest. 
Protests against his regime swelled after June 30, 2013, prompting the military to dispose 
Morsi on July 3, 2013 and to suspend the constitution (Freedom House, 2014). 
 Since the ousting of Morsi the military and judiciary have been in firm control of the 
country. Adli Mansour, the chairman of the Supreme Constitutional Court, was appointed as 
head of the interim government. A panel of jurists was tasked with drafting the new 
constitution, which was adopted in January 2014. In May 2014 former minister of defence 
and commander of the armed forces Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi was elected Egypt’s new president 
(Freedom House, 2014).  
 After the ousting of the Muslim Brotherhood the military initiated a harsh crackdown 
on the organisation and declared the organization a terrorist organization (Freedom House, 
2014). According to Freedom House (2014) last year has seen extreme political repression. 
1200 Muslim Brothers have been given the death penalty or life imprisonment for the killing 
of two policemen. According to a report of Human Rights Watch (2014) 16.000 political 
activists have been jailed and since the ouster of Morsi more than 900 civilians have been 
tried in military courts.  
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5.3 The Military and the Constitutions  
  
“The military should be granted some kind of insurance under Egypt’s new constitution so 
that it is not under the whim of a president and the military should not be subjected to 
parliamentary scrutiny” – SCAF member (in Martini & Taylor, 2011) 
Three and a half year after president Mubarak was ousted Egypt has had three constitutions. 
The first, SCAF’s Constitutional Declaration, entered into force in March 2011 and lasted 
until the permanent constitution at the beginning of 2012 was adopted. An Islamists 
dominated constitutional assembly under Morsi’s presidency drafted the second constitution. 
The military suspended this constitution with the ousting of Morsi in July 2013. A new 
constitution was drafted by a group of legal experts and has been adopted after it has been put 
to a popular vote in January 2014. In all three constitutions the SCAF has clearly tried to 
legitimize its own position in the political system, has demanded certain prerogatives and 
ensured its autonomy.  
  
5.3.1	  The	  Constitutional	  Declaration	  	  
 
The first interim constitution, the constitutional declaration of the SCAF, was issued after the 
Egyptian population had voted on amendments of the 1971 constitution two weeks earlier. 
Although the SCAF included most of these amendments in its own declaration, it seemed like 
the SCAF issued its own declaration in order to legitimize its position. The declaration for the 
first time provided the military with a legal basis to rule, as former constitutions have never 
mentioned the military as a political actor (Stacher, 2012). In fact the constitutional 
declaration placed the SCAF above the constitution (Droz-Vincent, 2013: 16; Albrecht and 
Bishara, 2011: 16-17).  
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 The declaration, consisting of 63 articles, would act as the temporary legal framework 
until a new constitution would be drafted (Albrecht & Bishara, 2011: 16-17). The 
amendments proposed by the legal committee to reduce the presidential term from six to four 
years, whit a two-term limit; to ease the presidential candidate registration procedures; to 
obligate the installation of a vice-president; and to restore the role of the judiciary as 
supervisor of the electoral process were incorporated (IFES, 2011). Striking is article 56, 
which gave the SCAF overwhelming executive and legislative powers, even after a new 
parliament and council would have been elected. The SCAF authorized itself to: issue 
legislation; implement policy; call and adjourn the sessions of the assembly and council; 
promulgate laws and object them; appoint the head of the cabinet and ministers; appoint 
civilian and military employees (Egyptian Government Services Portal (EGSP), 2011; El-Din, 
2011). It furthermore decreed that drafting a permanent constitution was the responsibility of 
a hundred-member constitutional assembly which would be appointed by an elected 
parliament (El-Din, 2011; IFES, 2013). 
 
5.3.2	  The	  Selmy	  Document	  	  
 
The first document which shaped the civil-military relations in the permanent constitution was 
issued in November 2011 by then deputy prime minister Selmy. He drafted a list of 
fundamental principles which would be guiding in the writing of a new constitution by the 
constitutional assembly (Sayigh, 2011). The list granted the SCAF as well tremendous powers 
in the defence area as in overseeing the drafting of the new constitution. In the defence area 
the list suggested that the SCAF would be the only authority responsible for matters 
concerning the military, including the budget and all bills related to the armed forces. It also 
stated that the president needed to consult the SCAF before it declared war. It furthermore 
proposed to revive the National Defence Council, a council which had not been in action 
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since Sadat’s presidency (Al-Masry Al-Youm, 2012). In overseeing the drafting of the 
constitution the document stated that the SCAF would have the power to overrule any passage 
that “contradicts the basic tenets of the Egyptian state and society” (International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), 2011). It furthermore gave the SCAF the right 
to form a new constitutional assembly if the former failed to draft a constitution within six 
months (International IDEA, 2011).   
 The Selmy document did not become binding and its provisions on the role of the 
SCAF in overseeing and appointing the constitutional assembly were later on annulled by 
president Mohamed Morsi. Its provisions on Egypt’s civil-military relations became however 
part of both the 2012 and 2013 constitutions.  
 
5.3.3	  The	  2012	  Constitution	  	  	  
 
The drafting of the permanent constitution has been dominated by political struggles between 
the Islamists, secularist, liberalist, the SCAF and the judiciary. The constitutional assembly 
was appointed in March 2012 and was heavily dominated by the Islamist parties. In April an 
administrative court ruled the constitutional assembly unconstitutional, because fifty of its 
members were elected members of the lower house, which was not in line with the interim 
constitution (IFES, 2013: 7). This move is widely seen as an institutional competition, as the 
judiciary is aligned with the military and anti-Islamists (IFES, 2013: 8). In June the lower and 
upper house elected a new constitutional assembly. The political struggles continued, but the 
constitutional assembly succeed in putting forward a draft constitution at the beginning of 
December (Freedom House 2013). The constitution was put to a vote through a referendum 
on December 15, 2012. There were allegations of fraud and vote rigging, however no official 
irregularities were found. The constitution was adopted on December 26, 2012 with 64% of 
56 The Role of the Military in Political Transitions   	  
	  
the votes in favour (voter turnout was 33%). The political legitimacy of the constitution was 
however seriously questioned (IFES, 2013: 9).  
             The powers the 2012 constitution granted to the military were extensive and similar to 
those set out in the list of fundamental principles of 2011. In the first place the constitution 
dictated that the minister of defence would be as well the Commander in Chief and has to be 
appointed from among the military officers. It is common that the Ministry of Defence is 
granted to the military in a transition, but not that this is stipulated in the constitution (Sayigh, 
2013). Secondly, the constitution revived the National Defence Council (NDC). The NDC 
would consist of both civilian and military officials, but tilted the balance towards the military: 
eight out of the fifteen seats would be filled with military officers (Sayigh, 2013). The NDC 
was tasked with discussing the methods of ensuring safety and security, discussing the 
military budget and all draft laws related to the armed forces. The constitution furthermore 
dictated that the president could only declare war after consulting the NDC (Egypt 
Independent, 2012). Finally, the trying of civilians in military courts was not banned and 
remained vaguely described. “Civilians shall not stand trial except for crimes that harm the 
Armed Forces. The law shall define such crimes” (article 198) (Egypt Independent, 2012).  
 
5.3.4	  The	  2014	  Constitution	  	  
 
The ousting of Mubarak led to the suspension of the 2012 constitution and the drafting of a 
new constitution at the end of 2013 by a panel of jurists. This constitution was adopted in the 
beginning of January 2014, after a referendum in which 98% voted in favour (turnout was 
37%). How free and fair this referendum was, is questionable (Freedom House, 2014). In the 
2014 constitution the powers of the military are even more entrenched than in the previous 
constitution. Apart from the notion that the minister of Defence needs to be an officer, the 
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approval of the SCAF for his appointment is as well needed, at least for the coming two full 
presidential terms. Main difference with the 2012 constitution is the addition that the military 
budget will be incorporated as a single figure in the state budget. As a consequence the 
civilian officials cannot exert control on the different aspects of the military budget. At the 
same time the constitution stipulates that in discussions on the budget of the armed forces the 
head of financial affairs from the armed forces and the heads of the planning and budgeting 
committee and of the national security committee of the lower house need to be included 
(ESIS, 2014). This seems to include some weak form of civilian oversight – at least a form of 
civilian involvement in budgetary discussion. Concerning the military courts, the constitution 
has become even more vague and broad. It stipulates that: “civilians cannot stand trial before 
military courts except for crimes that represent a direct assault against military courts, except 
for crimes that represent a direct assault against military facilities, barracks or whatever falls 
under their authority (..) or crimes that represent a direct assault against its officers or 
personnel” (ESIS, 2014).   
 
5.4 Political Parties and Electoral Laws   
 
The most important change in the first months of SCAF’s ruling in comparison to elections 
under Mubarak was the strengthening of the role of the judiciary in overseeing elections and 
allowing for political pluralism (Martini & Taylor, 2011; Freedom House, 2012). The SCAF 
issued a decree in March 2011 establishing the High Judicial Committee in charge of 
supervising elections. Furthermore the registration of political parties became more 
transparent. Banned political parties were legalized and new ones were allowed to organize 
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themselves (Martini & Taylor, 2011)7. The Justice and Freedom Party (JFP), the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s political party, was for instance formally legalized on June 6, 2011 (Irshad, 
2012)8. The NDP, the ruling party under Mubarak, was dissolved by an administrative court 
in April 2011. Its affiliates were however not banned from running in elections (Freedom 
House, 2012).  
 On May 29, 2011 the SCAF circulated the election law for the lower house and 
allowed political groups to submit proposed amendments and met with representatives of 
political groups (Albrecht & Bishara, 2011: 21-22). As a consequence SCAF amended the 
electoral system to a mix of two third based on closed party list and one third based on 
individual candidacy with two seat constituencies. This favoured political parties over 
individual candidacies, something the reformist advocated for as the individual candidacy 
system was in the benefit of candidates close to the old regime (Democracy Reporting 
International (DRI), 2011; IFES, 2013; Freedom House, 2012). The candidates from single-
member districts have often been ‘local power brokers’ who during the former regime ran 
independently and once elected joined the ruling NDP (Martini & Taylor, 2011). The SCAF 
amended the electoral system to a mix of two third based on closed party list and one third 
based on individual candidacy. The constitutional provision that 50 per cent of the candidates 
had to be ‘workers and farmers’ remained in place (IFES, 2013). 
 The same mixed electoral system was applied to the elections for the Shura Council; 
out of the 180 elected seats one third was elected on basis of closed party lists and one third 
on the basis of individual candidacy. The People’s Assembly was set to consist of 508 
members, of which ten would be appointed by the president. The Shura Council would consist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The new constitution adopted in January 2014 banned religious parties from running (FH, 2014).   8	  Note: the JFP has been banned since the ousting of Morsi in July 2013. The Muslim Brotherhood 
was declared a terrorist organization at the end of 2013.	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of 270 members of which 90 members would be appointed by the president (Freedom House, 
2012).  
 The mixed electoral system and increased transparency in the registration of political 
parties improved political pluralism. This however mainly benefitted existing political parties, 
as the timetable of the SCAF made it difficult for new political parties to organize themselves 
and to set up a campaign in time for the elections (Martini & Taylor, 2011; Stacher, 2012). 
Furthermore the political parties law dictated that new political parties needed to collect five 
thousand signatures instead of the initial one thousand and required the founders to publish 
their names in a state led newspaper, which costs are estimated to be around 150 dollar (El-
Din, 2011).    
 
5.5 Free and Fair Elections   
 
5.5.1	  Parliamentary	  Elections	  	  
 
Despite the manipulation of the SCAF on the electoral process and its gatekeeper function in 
allowing political parties to run in elections, the parliamentary elections have been considered 
to meet international standards. The elections were for a great part free, fair and enjoyed 
broad participation (Freedom House, 2012; Stacher, 2012; IFES, 2013). The majority of the 
votes went to Islamist parties; the JFP got 47% of the votes, and the Salafist Al-Nour party 
25%. The remaining seats went to the liberal Wafd party (8%), the Egyptian Bloc Coalition 
(7%), which is an alliance of liberal, social democratic and leftist political parties, and the 
other smaller parties (Azzam, 2012: 4; Stacher, 2012). The elections took place in three 
rounds. Voter turnouts have been historically high for Egypt. In the first round the voter 
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turnout was 65%, in the second round 43% and in the last round 62% (IFES, 2013; Azzam, 
2012; Irshad, 2012).  
 Following the lower house elections, the upper house elections were held in January 
and February 2012. Again the majority of the votes went to Islamist parties: 60% to Freedom 
and Justice Party, 25% to Al-Nour, 14% to Wafd and 8% to the Egyptian Bloc. Voter turnout 
was however very low, around the 15% (Freedom House, 2013). Apart from some 
irregularities and the low voter turnout, the elections have been considered free and fair (IFES, 
2013).  
 
5.5.2	  Presidential	  elections	  	  
 
The first post-Mubarak presidential elections were planned in May 2012. The elections were, 
although not perfect, close to international standards (Freedom House, 2013). The fairness of 
the registration of the candidates is however contested. The Presidential Election 
Commission, installed by the SCAF, disqualified ten candidates, including the most popular 
Islamist candidates. Their decision was final and could not be appealed (Freedom House, 
2013). According to Frisch (2013: 189) Hazem Salah Abu Ismail, a Salafi preacher, was 
rejected because he was the least co-optable and Khairat al-Shater, the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
candidate, was rejected because his good relations with the United States Department of State 
and American business leaders posed a threat to SCAF’s monopoly on those relations.  
 In the first round of presidential elections in May the population could vote for 
thirteen candidates. In June Morsi and Shafiq competed against each other in the second 
round of presidential elections. Morsi won the elections with 51,7% of the votes. The voter 
turnout in the first round was 46,6% and in the second round 52% (Irshad, 2012). The SCAF 
would have preferred Ahmed Shafiq as president, as he has been a commander in the 
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Egyptian Air Force and was appointed by Mubarak as Prime Minister a few days before 
Mubarak’s ousting (Hellyer, 2012; Egypt Independent, 2012). The SCC made Shafiq’s 
candidacy possible by ruling out a law which was passed by the People’s Assembly banning 
political figures from the former regime to run for office for at least ten years (Freedom 
House, 2013).  
 
5.6 The Parliament  
 
According to Frisch (2013: 189) the SCAF had a clear strategy by firstly organizing 
parliamentary elections and only afterwards presidential elections. This way the SCAF could 
already weaken and divide the ranks of parliament before a president was elected. This 
became clear when the Muslim Brotherhood, despite its electoral success, was unable to form 
a government as the SCAF refused to withdraw its support from the Ganzouri government, 
which it had appointed as interim government until a new president would be sworn in 
(Azzam, 2012: 6, Sayigh, 2011). Furthermore the parliament soon discovered it had no real 
power, as the SCAF had ensured in the interim constitution that the parliament could not pass 
legislation without the approval of the SCAF (Brown, 2013: 47). On the other hand the FJP 
succeeded in gaining the speaker’s position and heading twelve of the nineteen lower house 
committees, of which as well the more important ones as foreign relations and defence and 
national security (Miller et al, 2012: 99).   
 The People’s Assembly did not function for long, as in June 2012 the SCC dissolved 
lower house (Droz-Vincent, 2013: 16). The SCC ruled that it was unconstitutional that as well 
party backed as independent candidates competed for individual candidate seats, while this 
was not possible the other way around (IFES, 2013: 7). Once Morsi was inaugurated on June 
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30, 2012 he recalled the resolved parliament. The SCC however suspended Morsi’s decree, 
leaving the parliament suspended for the rest of the year (Sayigh, 2013; IFES, 2013: 7). The 
move by the SCC is seen as enforced by the SCAF to harm Islamists (Stacher, 2012; Azzam, 
2012: 6). Shenker (2011) already before the dissolution mentioned in the Guardian that: 
“Although the SCAF knew that throughout the transition period it needed to partially 
accommodate the most important political player, the Muslim Brotherhood, it is trying to 
outmanoeuvre and undermine it”.  
 
5.7 The President  
 
Two weeks before Mohamed Morsi was inaugurated as Egypt’s first democratically elected 
president, the SCAF issued an interim constitutional decree limiting the powers of the newly 
elected president and expanding its own powers (Brown, 2013: 48; Droz-Vincent, 2013: 16-
17; Sayigh, 2013). The decree granted the SCAF power over the new constitution writing 
process, the right to assume the responsibilities of the parliament as long as no new 
parliament is elected, and “the upper hand in running the armed forces” (Egypt Independent, 
2012). The president was prevented from declaring war without the SCAF’s approval and 
“the current head of the SCAF is to act as commander-in-chief of the armed forces and 
minister of defence until a new constitution is drafted” (Ahram Online, 2012). Furthermore 
the SCAF appointed the SCC to have the last word on the constitution in case the SCAF and 
other actors would disagree on its content (Ahram Online, 2012).  
 Once in office, president Morsi nullified the decree of the SCAF, and issued a 
constitutional declaration giving him full executive and legislative powers, including the right 
to form a new constitutional assembly (IFES, 2013: 8). On August 12, 2012 he sacked 
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minister of defence and chief of the armed forces, Mohamed Hussein Tantawi and deputy 
chief of staff Sami Anan and appointed them as presidential advisors (Sayigh, 2013; Freedom 
House 2013). He furthermore dismissed the commanders of the air force, air defence and 
navy. Morsi appointed General Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi as minister of defence and commander of 
the armed forces. Al-Sissi had been head of the military intelligence and part of the SCAF. 
General Mohammed el-Asser was appointed as deputy defence minister (Londono, 2012). 
Upon leaving office, Tantawi and Anan were honoured with accolades. Morsi appointed the 
navy commander as Chairman of the Suez Canal Authority, the air defence commander as 
Chairman of the Arab Organization for Industrialization and the air force commander as 
Minister of Military Production; all top civilian posts (Hussein, 2012; Aboulenein, 2012). 
 As a reaction on the dismissal of the top generals el-Asser told Reuters: “the decision 
was based on consultation with the field marshal and the rest of the military council” (Blair, 
2012). The deputy director of Egypt’s Organization for Human Rights commented: “What is 
happening now was planned once the SCAF realised they had to make a deal with the Muslim 
Brotherhood anyway” (Hussein, 2012). According to Droz-Vincent (2013: 12) this decision 
was a blow to the military in some sense, but it was mainly a way out of a ‘prisoners 
dilemma’, as the military had a strong desire to quite governing but did not find a ‘safe exit’. 
A safe exit refers to immunity from legal prosecution and independence (Azzam, 2012: 6-7). 
  In November 2012 Morsi caused stirring among the Egyptian public by expanding his 
presidential power in a ‘dramatic way’ (Brown, 2013: 49). He decreed that his decisions were 
above judicial review, and that the constitutional assembly and Shura council were immune 
for dissolution by the SCC (Freedom House, 2013). This lead to massive demonstrations in 
Cairo. Later in December 2012 he rescinded the decree, but only after he had protected an 
Islamist-dominated constitution assembly from dissolution, enabling the panel to pass a 
controversial draft constitution (Mccrummen, 2012). 
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  During Morsi’s year in office his relationship with Egypt’s population and the military 
soured. In the spring of 2013 activists started to campaign against his presidency, leading to 
mass protests on June 30, a year after his inauguration. The military detained him on July 3, 
2013 and suspended the constitution. Instead of the SCAF, the SCC was now tasked with 
executive power (Freedom House, 2014).  
CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION  
The introduction of this thesis started with two quotes: one from an Egyptian major and one 
from a protester at Tahrir square. The first commented that the Egyptian revolution removed a 
regime, but did not destroy it. According to him the military did not protect the revolution, but 
rather ‘made it happen’. The second commented that the protestors left the square before the 
power was in their hands. In analysing the Egyptian case it has become clear that both the 
major and protestor were right. The mass demonstrations across Egypt at the beginning of 
2011 toppled Mubarak, but left the ‘deep state’, of which the military is part, intact.  
 The question that stood central in this research was the extent to which and the 
accompanying conditions under which a political military is willing to allow for 
democratization during a political transition. The case of Egypt has shown to be very similar 
to the behaviour of political militaries in Latin America and Southern Europe during the 
seventies and eighties of last century. Like those militaries the Egyptian military has tried to 
protect its institutional interests as much as possible, by granting itself provisions within the 
constitution, rejecting any form of civilian oversight over the military and over its budget and 
reviving governmental bodies which are dominated by military officers.  
 Expectations derived from the theoretical framework were that the Egyptian military 
would either install a caretaker military junta or would seek to restore its position as under 
Mubarak. The first fifteen months after the ousting of Mubarak the SCAF has indeed 
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functioned as a caretaker military junta. In those months the Egyptian military has showed 
initial willingness to allow for more political rights, by allowing for multiparty elections and 
amending the electoral law in favour of political parties. The SCAF enabled Egypt’s first free 
and fair parliamentary and presidential elections, which led to the appointment of the first 
civilian president without a military background in Egypt’s history.  
 Different than in Latin America and South Europe the SCAF has tried to regain its 
comfortable position to rule from behind a façade. That probably declares why the generals 
allowed Morsi to reshuffle the top of the military; he gave them a ‘safe exit’ and appointed 
them to top civilian positions. With Morsi ousted, the Muslim Brotherhood outlawed and 
former minister of defence Al-Sisi now as president everything seems to be back to the same 
old. However this time the SCAF is backed by a constitution granting the military officially 
extensive powers over the defence ministry, its budget, laws and the right to trial civilians in 
military courts. The role of the military has thus been strengthened by the transition.  
 The Egyptian case has shown that four of the six independent variables set out in the 
theoretical framework have explanatory value for the willingness of the Egyptian military to 
allow for democratization during a political transition. The character of the military, the 
degree to which it was involved in directly governing, the nature of the transition and the 
strength of the civil and political society do for a great extent determine the extent to which a 
military will be willing to allow for democratization. The variable on the institutionalization 
of the military into the legal framework of a country seemed less applicable to the Egyptian 
case. On the other hand it does have explanatory value for the constitutional proclamation 
issued by the SCAF to legitimize its role in the transition. The other less relevant variable 
seems to be international pressure. This variable has however not been researched extensively 
in this thesis and is a subject for further research.  
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 Next to those six variables, one other variable seems to have played an important role 
in determining the military’s willingness to allow for democratization. This variable is the 
economic interest of the military. Many political militaries assume economic roles, but no 
other military has been directly involved in manufacturing and providing services outside of 
the defence area. This probably has great implications for the willingness of the military to 
allow for civilian oversight and its implications need further research.  
 The conditions under which the Egyptian military will retreat from politics remain 
unclear. Military disengagements from politics are not uncommon, but political neutrality is. 
The extensive prerogatives the SCAF has granted itself in the constitution will make it very 
difficult for any future civilian leader to exercise democratic control over the military. It 
seems that Finer (1962) was right. The only way to reach military neutrality is when the 
military believes in the basic principle of civil supremacy. With Al-Sisi as president the 
military restored its comfortable position of ruling from behind a façade. At the same time 
some change might be underway as Al-Sisi is faced with a new political reality. He is no 
longer supported by a ruling party as Mubarak was. Furthermore the Egyptian people have 
found the courage to express their disaffection with the government’s policy.  
 Looking at the civil-military relations in Turkey, international incentives might be the 
most effective way to alter the civil-military balance. In Turkey the EU has played a key role 
in providing for incentives and setting benchmarks for the implementation of more 
democratic civil-military relations. The United States may use this carrot and stick method for 
its financial aid to Egypt. President Bush for instance succeeded in pressuring Mubarak to 
organize multi-candidacy presidential elections. Further research is needed in order to explore 
this option.  
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